Democratisation may not Alter Pakistan’s Strategic Designs

by RAJIV RANJAN SINHA
Posted on 2008-08-08
INDIAN, American and Afghan interests on the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a sponsor of terrorism are converging for the first time. Intelligence agencies in New Delhi, Washington and Kabul are separately picking up a tail of evidence on the July 7 attack on the Indian embassy that leads to Rawalpindi. The common conclusion on the role of the ISI is likely to be more prominently played up during the Afghan President, Mr Hamid Karzai’s scheduled visit to New Delhi beginning on August 4. The Indian Prime Minister already had long discussions on the issue with his Pakistani counterpart Mr Yousuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Colombo.
Mr Karzai and Indian leaders frequently say that their countries are hit by ‘cross-border terrorism’. Mr Karzai’s interior minister, like India’s national security adviser, Mr M K Narayanan, has said the attack on the Indian embassy was orchestrated by the ISI. On August 1, ‘The New York Times’ reported that ‘Americans intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing in Kabul, Afghanistan, according to United States government official.’ Intercepts of communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and the militants who carried out the attack are said to be with US agencies.
The convergence of Indian and American interests on the ISI is rare. The Manmohan Singh government has achieved – by accident or by design – what the best efforts of the Vajpayee-led NDA government after the hijack of an Indian aircraft in 1999 and the Parliament attack in 2001 could not. Despite the efforts following those acts of terrorism, Washington was still chary of accepting New Delhi’s insistence that the apparatus of militancy was located within Pakistan. Now, after moving closer to the Indian position on the ISI, the US is piling pressure on the Gilani government but hard-hitting options are being kept in abeyance.This is because the US is already embroiled in two separate wars with too many boots on the ground, because of a question mark over Iran and the fact that US and NATO forces in Afghanistan are heavily dependent on supplies through Pakistan.
The Afghanistan President, Mr Hamid Karzai’s broke an increasingly brittle silence over Islamabad’s role in supporting terrorism by bluntly telling the SAARC summit that institutional backing has led to terrorist striking deeper roots in Pakistan. Mr Karzai has made no secret of his anger over Pakistan’s ISI collaborating with Taliban to launch attacks in Afghanistan in the past. He has directly named ISI in the suicide bombing at the Indian embassy in Kabul. But by naming Pakistan in a summit speech, he has positioned Islamabad as being central to the problem of terrorism.
While Mr Gilani’s options are unclear given the nebulous control he wields over the ISI and the army establishment, Pakistan may not find it easy to fend off Mr Karzai’s ‘name and shame’ tactics. It also means that Mr Karzai is mounting pressure on the US to use its leverage with Pakistan. Bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul is perhaps the first salvo of what Islamists consider will be the post-Bush endgame in Afghanistan. Barring stray attacks on individuals who had injudiciously strayed from the security perimeter, the 4000 or so Indians in Afghanistan have so far not been targeted by the Taliban. The Islamist zealots have let loose their suicide bombers and guerrillas against either the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force or Afghans who are linked to the Mr Hamid Karzai dispensation.
The Taliban’s war of attrition has devastated Western morale. Although no politician of consequence – not even Barak Obama – has actually clubbed Afghanistan with the mess in Iraq, there is a growing impression in the public mind that both wars are the same and equally un-winnable. The more perceptive of Western strategists recognise that no military success is possible until the Taliban are denied their sanctuaries and supplies across the Durand Line. However, the political will to take on a duplicitous Pakistani establishment is lacking. The West doesn’t have the stomach to add Pakistan to its ever-growing list of Islamic enemies. The political upheaval in Pakistan has ironically given a fillip to those forces in the West that want to opt out of messy engagements in strange places.
In theory, this is an appealing path particularly since the neo-conservative agenda has been found wanting. Unfortunately, the complexities of Pakistani society defy such optimistic expectations. It is important to bear in mind that the votaries of a liberal, democratic order are still in a minority. The movement for democracy is also being fuelled by those who perceive the USA as the greatest obstacle to Pakistan fulfilling its commitment to the wider ‘Ummah’. This ties in beautifully with that section of the Pakistani establishment that sees the recovery of strategic depth in Afghanistan and the liberation of Kashmir as indispensable to the country’s being. Ironically, and despite the abuse showered on the institution by the country’s liberals, it also converges with the ISI desire to operate in an US-free environment. It is interesting, for example, that Mr Imran Khan – whose passion for democracy is undeniable – has consistently posited the Taliban as rugged, god-fearing tribals who just want to live their own lives and should be permitted to do so.
There is a sharp contradiction between the war on terror and what Pakistan perceives as its national interests. Democracy far from narrowing the gap may end up as an instrument of Pakistan’s recklessness. Despite the disapproval of the West and Mr Karzai’s threat to engage in hot pursuit across the Durand Line, the Pakistani military establishment has persisted in providing logistical assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Mr Ahmed Rashid has detailed the ISI’s subterfuge in his recent book ‘Descent Into Chaos’. The massive attack on the Indian embassy, which the authorities in Kabul have blamed on the ISI (without actually naming it) was intended to scare away the Indians who are working on important nation-building assignments in Afghanistan – not least as advisers to the Karzai government. The attack was an open warning that assumes relevance in the context of the West’s desperation to reduce its involvement in the troubled zone. That the attack took place at a time when governance in India has for all practical purposes been put on hold makes it even more menacing.
Whether the Pakistani desire to reclaim Afghanistan and then focus on Kashmir succeeds or not will depend on the outcome of the US presidential poll and the ability of the British PM, Mr Gordon Brown to weather his own internal storm. On its part, India has to prepare for the worst. Unfortunately, the uncertain trajectory of domestic politics and the absence of decisive leadership at the helm have put a question mark on the protection of our strategic interest. Democracy in Pakistan will not alter the fundamentals of that country’s strategic designs. – INAV